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ABSTRACT:
Identity is not a social entity. It is not embodied in
a social individual, or social institutions. It is not,
further, inscribed on the space of language. That is,
language does not create or even contain identity. In
this sense, in the absence of the stability of identity
in any social form and representation, the question of
the social status of identity is raised with a critical
awareness that cautions us against any hasty assertion
of the reality of identity. These propositions emerge
from the research that I have been conducting on the
question of the formation of identity among a group of
African women workers in the Retail sector. These women
live in the nearby African townships of Johannesburg.
The majority of them are active members of the dominant
trade union in the retail sector, South African
Commercial and Catering Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU).
The study explores the question of identity formation
in their lives, with respect to two significant social
spaces, the workplace and vicinity. These are the
social spaces within which their lives emerge and are
located. Their lives are dispersed within these social
spaces.
"Within every society, each social agent is inscribed
in a multiplicity of social relations - not only social
production but also the social relations, among others,
of sex, race, nationality, and vicinity".2
This paper is part of a Ph.D project on the study of identity-
construction among urban African women workers in the Gauteng province.
Chantal Mouffe, "Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Towards a
New Concept of Democracy", Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg (eds.), Marxism
and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 1988), p. 89-90.
PREFACE:
Let me begin by asserting the' unproblematic significance of the
gesture of a preface.3 I want to provide the reader with a
preliminary outline of some of the critical ideas underlying this
paper. First, and this is essential to an understanding of the
intellectual history that informs this project, this paper is a
critical intervention in the subdiscipline of social theory. Both
the project and the paper are exercises in social theory. Both
were conceived as critical intervention in social theory. They
seek to advance the interests of social theory, which, in this
case, are concerned with the articulation of the formation of the
social object of identity. [The notion of articulation is at the
core of this specific social theorization. Thus, this specific
social theory is one deeply embedded in the practice of
articulation]. Thus, the character of the material that has been
amassed is one of the sort that is directly related to the
concerns of the performance of social theory. Social theory is
the objective of this project, and through the engagement with
the notion of identity, I seek to advance new modes of thinking
in social theory on the question of identity. In this sense, the
project has a critical, if not radical relation to the question
of identity in contemporary social theory. Second, the project
was born from a concern with the status of thinking and
theorization on identity in social theory, specifically, the
practices of Marxism. In this regard, the project engages in a
direct critique of Marxisms on the question of identity. The
gestures of overcoming, in their facile forms, forms that
question their claims to authenticity, the limits of Marxist
thinking on the question of identity are performed through the
ideas of post-structuralism and other posties (especially,
postcolonialism and postfeminism). Specifically, the overcoming
of the limits of Marxisms on the question of identity is
conducted through the complex theoretical analyses of the
following post-structuralists thinkers: Deleuze, Derrida, and
Foucault. Third, the theoretical gestures of the articulation of
a non-marxist, or even post-marxist, and sometimes, an anti-
Marxist notion of identity are supplemented through the
problematic activity of empirical research and data. The latter,
it must be stressed, exists only as a supplement ("The supplement
adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another
In Phenomelocrv of Spirit. Hegel raises the problem of a preface in
relation to philosophy. He writes that a preface in a philosophical work is
"superfluous", "inappropriate and misleading". Philosophy can never be
prefaced, in that it is not a completed system. Can social life be prefaced?
Is our relation to social life, in its many histories, objectifiable through a
sense of its completeness? That is, is it possible to imagine a complete
understanding of social life, of life itself? Do we also retain the
possibility of uttering the tentative word on social life and relations?
plenitude", p. 144, Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology. 1976),
because the objective of the project is not a simple insertion of
empirical data. In as far as the supplement functions, enabling
the project to perform the practice of the articulation, i t
remains critical to the ideals of the project. The ideal is the
possibility to think outside of the categories of identity.
Fourth, the main aspects of this project are theoretical and
methodological. Any reference to empirical demonstration and data
are incidental, or rather supplementary. In this regard, the
project is a systematic engagement with contemporary thinking on
the question of identity. If there is any contribution which this
project seeks to make is in the area of the literature of
identity. On the methodological question of the study of
identity, the project attempts to problematize the practices of
researching identity [what social research methods are
appropriate for the research of identity? Is identity a given
social fact, if so what social research methods can best capture
it , rediscover i t , make it representable to us? what are the
social forms that embodies identity?]. However, this
methodological concern is preceded by a theoretical critique of
identity. This is the engagement with the theoretical
investigation of identity. Once this is achieved, we then begin
the discussion of questions of methodology on the question of
identity. Stil l , what ties both concerns of the project is the
underlying theme of the deconstruction of identity. This
deconstruction is articulated at both the theoretical and
methodological levels. The specific form of the theoretical
analysis of identity is the intimate relation i t has with the
philosophical discourse on identity, the analytics of identity,
and the conceptualization on identity.4 The second level, the
level of methodological questions on identity moves towards the
issues of the empiricity of identity. Basically, my concern is to
examine the question of the social research of identity, the
conduct and practices of social research in relation to the
question of identity. This is where I begin to touch upon the
value of empirical evidence. Thus, the order of the analysis is
as follows: theoretical investigations on the question of
* The theoretical concern of this project is to articulate a
postmodern analysis of identity-construction within the two most significant
social spaces in the lives of African women workers, the workplace and
•community1. However, there is no linear linkage between these two social
spaces, or any sense of prioritization. Neither social space is primary to the
other. The attempt is to understand the question of identity - what is
identity in the lives of African women workers, how is identity possible, when
is identity possible, is there a single identity that underlines their lives
in the relatively autonomous social spaces? The project methodology is one
that is largely qualitative, in that the underlying theoretical assumption
concerning the question of identity is that identity is a qualitative social
process. The discussion that follows attempts to show the duality of identity-
formation and constitution in the lives of certain of these women.
identity; methodological analysis of the study of identity, and
linked to this is the question of the empirical orders of
identity [what is the empirical reality of identity? what is the
empirical distribution of identity? what constitutes the
empirical reality of identity? what are the boundaries of this
empirical reality - where does it begin and where does it end?
what is empirical about identity? what is the social character of
this empirical reality? how does one begin to engage with this
reality? what forms of representation of identity take place
within the logic of this reality?].
CRITICAL DISCLAIMERS:
The following set of disclaimers are important to note. First,
this is not a study of trade unionism, or a trade union, in this
instance, SACCAWU. The research question that I wanted to
investigate does not allow for the study of the organizational
structures and dynamics of the location of identity. Through the
research, I realized the relative insignificance of the study of
an organization, the trade union, to the question of identity
formation. This is not to say that identity did not find
expression within and through the union, in whatever form. But
the union did not determine, or even shape identity in any
significant sense. Identity within the union has relative
autonomy, a social existence of its own, a presence that is
realized outside of the union boundaries. There was a sense in
which being a union member was relatively dependent on the
capability of the union to meet workers' needs and interests.
Thus, according to one worker: "I no longer consider myself a
member of the union. The union is now useless. They do nothing
for us".5 Another worker added, when asked about the role of the
shopsteward: "These guys are weak. They agree with everything
that management says. Who should we trust now?".6 Alongside such
experiences and perception there was a sense in which workers saw
themselves as outside of the union, even when they continued to
pay their monthly subscriptions. They had given up on the union.
The union was seen as a relative organization in their lives, and
in this sense we can begin to understand and question the non-
union processes that are directly linked to the question of
identity-formation.
Second, I would like to note also that this is not a study of the
labour process, a study of the organization of work in the retail
sector. It is not a study of the retail industry. My interest is
not in the relation that African women workers have with the
structure of work, their skills in the workplace, the
significance and impact of technology on their work, and the
Interview, Ormonde Pick 'n Pay, November 199 4.
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 Interview, Randburg Pick 'n Pay, October 1993.
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differences and distribution in occupations. The issue of the
organization of work links itself to the question of capital, its
structure and development. To exclude the question of the
organization of work in the study of identity is not, however, to
deny the relative location of identity in the organization of
work. The retail sector is largely operated by women, and the
social demography of these women differs from Durban (Indian), to
the Western Cape (Coloured), and Gauteng (African). However, the
majority of women in this research have a history of working in
the Frontline Department. The relationship between gender and
work, skills and occupation is important to the workings of the
retail sector. The same applies to the social distribution of
gender in the workplace, in terms of the potentials of each
gender. One worker observed: "Management does not want to put men
here (Frontline Department) because they know that men does not
stand silly customers".7 Her view is that "we women tolerate
nonsense". "Pick 'n Pay management expects us to nice to rude
customers. Sometimes I cant stand it", she continued.9 Still,
identity stands outside of this relation with the organization of
work, for the simple reason that the research reveals that what
constitutes identity for African women in the retail sector is a
process that is linked to other non-workplace developments.
Third, this is not a study of capital/labour relations. Although
capital and labour in the retail sector, especially in from the
1980s, have a history of conflict, this is not important to the
understanding of identity formation. It is true that SACCAWU is
one of the militant trade union within COSATU, and that it has
the ability to mobilize its workers into a variety of industrial
actions. However, these do not, from the observations that I have
conducted, begin to articulate the complex forms of identities
that one observes within the union. That is, a particular
industrial action is the appropriation of, or the construction of
a single identity, from other and multiple identities. A strike,
such as the National 1994 Strike with Pick 'n Pay, even in its
complex levels, is not the accumulation of and reflection of the
union's true identity. Identity is complex a social reality to be
contained within capital/labour relation.
WORKPLACE OR WORKSPACE? SHIFTS AND BOUNDARIES.
The formation of identity in the workplace takes place in the
social relations which African women workers have with
management, the union, other workers, the workplace itself, as a
relatively bounded physical structure, and the customers. Within
7
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the category of other workers, we find, and this is not specific
to the retail sector, or the character of the workplace, a
diversity of relations and identities, such as gender, ethnicity,
unionized and non-unionized workers, political affiliations,
differences in social knowledge about contemporary politics,
differences in social and cultural tastes [I was told by one
interviewee that "women at Pick 'n Pay always dress to kill. They
are lookable, and you feel that they are important to
themselves"10] . The category of workers is no longer a
reflection of the same identity, and similar social interests.
Management is also characterised by differences in ethnic
composition, gender hierarchy, and managerial style. Thus, what
constitutes identity in the workplace is not a single relation,
or event, if event is defined as dramatic, one-off thing.
Identity is formed through what I call the "politics of
perception, or "politics of sense". Reference to identity in the
workplace is made with reg"ard~tiD~mQi±ens~o"f~~exc-lu"s±on—and
participation, of discrimination and inclusion.11 My research
impressions reveals that there is no sense of workers identity in
the workplace.12 What seems to be characteristic of the retail
workplace, in terms of identity is the social reality of
difference, multiple differences. Thus, it is within these
differences, differences that come to have relative presence
through interviews and observations that we can tentatively
situate our analysis of identity.
But then we need to ask: what is the workplace in the physical
outlines of a supermarket? In fact, we need to ask further, what
is work in the retail sector? I do not deal with the latter
question. The workplace in the retail sector is more like a
workspace. It is not the "hidden abode" that Marx was concerned
about. It is not a production space, which is limited to the
uneven co-existence of capital/labour relations. Rather, it is a
space that allows and is disrupted by other social relations.
1 0
 Interview, Rosebank Pick n1 Pay, March 1995.
1 1
 In various stores, there is a strong consciousness of racism and
racial discrimination. African women workers that were interviewed saw racism
as a major obstacle to their advancement within Pick 'n Pay. The social
reality of racism is sharply experienced by the majority of them who work in
the Frontline Department. "I hate this place. Everyday you have to stand
nonsense from both customers and management" (Interview, Ormonde, November
1994). There was a sense in which she felt trapped in this position.
1 2
 Within the structure of work in the workplace, the union can only
organize a meeting during the morning tea-break. This meeting, which takes
once a week, disrupts non-union workers. What emerges is that in the
organization of work, there is no space set aside for the union's activities.
The reconstitution of workers identity is difficult to realize, as the daily
operation of the union in the workplace is marginalized.
These are social relations that are not limited and defined by
class politics of the traditional workplace. It is within this
space that identity formation takes place, that it becomes
possible to comprehend, especially in its outlines as a social
reality of difference. Thus, space is not a physical boundary
that contains social relations and identity. The relativity of
the following proposition expresses place and space as
constraining: "identities are shaped by embodied and embedded
narratives, located in particular places and times" (Space &
Place: Theories of Identity and Location, edited by Erica Carter,
James Donald & Judith Squires, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1993,
p. x) . Carter et al. argue that we need to conceptualise identity
outside of the boundaries of space, and locate it within places
(Space & Place, p.xii). They argue that places play a significant
role in the "symbolic and psychical dimensions" of identity
(Space & Place, p.xii). This transformation of space into place
is possible through the linguistic gesture of naming. Place
contains meaning. It is invested with meaning and value. But then
their notion of place expresses a desire for locality, home, and
presence. However, it is David Morley and Kevin Robins who have
argued that "Places are no longer the clear support of our
identity" (Space & Place, p.5. My emphasis). Place constrains
through its reference to a physical presence. The work-place
operates with the same understanding. In contrast, space does not
confine and limit the emergence and existence of social
relations. Space allows for a temporal relation to a physical
realm, but what remains significant are the relations that begin
to be realized within its shifting boundaries. Certainly, the
shift from thinking about work-place to thinking about work-space
is an attempt to show the problematic idea of trying to fix
identity by giving it a sense of origin.
CASE ONE: IDENTITY-FORMATION IN THE WORKSPACE.
What follows is a discussion of an interview that was conducted
in Zulu, which was the language that the interviewee was
comfortable with.13 It was recorded in both Zulu and English.
The Interview was conducted at her workspace, and we were
constantly interrupted by customers. This was the only space
where she had time to speak to me. On that day, she had decided
not to go out for lunch. This woman has been with Pick 'n Pay
since 1983. She joined Pick 'n Pay from Hyperama. She left the
latter because "the conditions were not good. I was not treated
properly by the white supervisors". She was hired at the door,
when the Ormonde Pick 'n Pay branch was opened in 1983. From 1983
to 1991, she worked as a cashier in the Frontline Department. It
was as a result of suffering backpains due to the strain involved
that she was transferred to the textile department. She was in
the textile department for the whole of 1992. She was kept out of
Interview, Ormonde Pick n1 Pay, November 1994.
7
work for over seven months, after she was injured in a car
accident [She complains bitterly about the treatment which she
received from Pick 'n Pay. "They did not care whether I had
medical care or not. In fact, they did not want me back"].
However, in April 1994 she was able to return to work. She now
works as cheque and credit cards authorizer. She limps. She
fractured her left leg, in the accident. She has never been
active in the union, except in the 1986 National Strike.
"Everyone had to participate in that one (strike)", she
commented. Her reason for not participating in the other
activities of the union is that the union requires lots of time
and travel: "I stay very far in Sebokeng, and I cant be able to
attend many meetings". She is a single mother, with a daughter.
She has never been married.
The interview with her raised the issue of race and its
relationship to work^rrelaLed matters-;—She drd-^tot—see—being—a
woman as a critical condition for her employment at Pick 'n Pay.
She works from 09h00-18h00, if she has to have lunch. Without
lunch, she works until 17h00. She moved to Sebokeng in 1988.
Before, she lived in Zola, Soweto. The Strikes she recalls are
the 1986 National Strike and 1994 National Strike. The 1986
National Strike was one in which sleep-in were conducted
throughout Pick 'n Pay stores.
"The union used to be active, looking after the
interests of workers. But now people are dismissed, and
the union does not appear to challenge the decisions
made by management".
"Pick 'n Pay is involved in "retrenchments in disguise,
and the union is doing nothing about it".
She feels discriminated against "Not because I'm a woman, but
because I'm [umuntu umunyama] (black)". She argues that "Being a
woman at Pick 'n Pay is not an issue. What matters is your
colour". Like the other women who were interviewed, the terms
black appears to refer to African identity. Thus, Shirley
differentiates between blacks and coloureds. Coloured are seen as
not interested in the union. They are seen to be paid better. The
racism is not, at leats at Ormonde, and in her view, between
black and white; it is between blacks and coloureds. [The
management, at the time of research was a coloured male. He had
been there for over nine months.] But Shirley notes that most of
her white colleagues that she started with in 1983 have now moved
into managerial positions, they have to other stores: "I've been
a cashier, and I was never given an opportunity to train for
other better positions". She concludes: "Pick 'n Pay is racist".
Her consciousness of the union is not sharp and thorough. Her
consciousness is most sharp, regarding her experience at Pick 'n
Pay. Her racial identity has a particular meaning in the
workplace. It appears to be dependent on the dynamics which she
8
has with the management structures.
She is committed to the idea of a trade union, in sofar as it
advances the basic issues of workers. "Pick 'n Pay treats us
(black people) alike. It does not differentiate between men
and women". Her consciousness on race reveals an awareness of
black, coloured, and white. "The union is for blacks". [The
racial composition of SACCAWU differs with its regional context.
The marginal group are the coloureds. They are seen as
conservative and reactionary. They are anti-union. "We have few
coloured members in the union". "I have been with the union for a
longtime". "I joined the union so as not to be victimized by
management". She has clear views on race relations in the
workplace. "Most black never advance beyond the level of
supervisors".
IN HER OWN WORDS:
"Blacks join the union because they seek protection
against racism".
"I joined the union because there was favouritism in
terms of wages".
"What the union has done for me is to protect me
against unfair treatment by management and to fight for
wage increase".
"In the early 1980s racism was widespread at Pick 'n
Pay. Even now there is still racism. Nothing has
changed".
"Coloureds were working during this years's strike
(1994) " .
"They [coloured] brought their families to work, while
we were on strike".
"The money we [blacks] get from Pick 'n Pay is too
little: You can hardly furnish your house".
CASE TWO: CONSTRUCTION AND APPROPRIATION OF IDENTITY:
The Interview was conducted in Tswana.14 The interviewee is a
Mofurutshi. She started working at Pick 'n Pay (Randburg) in 1989
as a casual, and it was only in 1992 when she was accepted as
permanent staff. She has been injured three times at work, and
for all these times she has never been compensated. The first
time, she had her finger injured. The second time, she fell and
1 4
 Interview, Randburg Pick 'n Pay, December, 1994.
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injured her back. The third time, she was involved in an accident
while travelling in the Company's Staff Bus. She joined the union
in 1989. She was active in the 1994 Strike. She attends all the
meetings and other activities. She is from Diepkloof, Soweto. She
is married with two children. At the time of the interview, she
was living in a flat in Hillbrow. She is also an active member of
Christian Family Church.
"In this store things are terrible". "Most people have
left, they have taken transfers to go to other Pick 'n
Pay Branches"
She stressed the significance of race in her experience at Pick
'n Pay. She has thus sought to escape racism by transferring to
another store.
"White people get their accident benefits quicker, and
we do not get them at all". "I work because I am very
poor".
She perceives the management at Pick 'n Pay Randburg to be
racist. She joined SACCAWU because she saw it as the union which
advanced the interests of black workers.
IN HER OWN WORDS:
"I'm sorry, ... but I must say this: I do not like
coloureds!". "They are reactionaries". "For example,
during the recent strike, the coloureds did not toyi-
toyi, while some whites at the Head Office joined the
strike". "Coloureds think that they are whites". "Most
of them feel obliged to police black people". "Even
here in the Frontline Department, there are no
relations between blacks and coloureds". "It is worse
among the supervisors".
"This management is terrible". "He wants to have his
word as the last". "He listens to no one". "He has no
respect for the shopstewards". "When we ask him about
permanent work, he tells us that Head Office is
refusing". He is racist [the store manager]. "He
favours coloureds".
"SACCAWU does nothing for casual workers". "I have
decided to stop my subscriptions, two months ago". "We
pay our subscriptions, and the union does nothing for
us". "The union is dead". "What the union does instead
is to believe and report to us whatever nonsense
management tells them".
Trade unionism is seen as a legitimate mechanism to advance the
interest of black workers; it is likely to attract black workers
10
much easier than other workers, at leats at Pick 'n Pay. This
points out the significance of race; the experience of being
treated as a black person, of being denied opportunities simply
because one is black lead most black workers to join the trade
union.
Racism in the workplace is a significance experience for most of
the African women worker who were interviewed for this project.
Thus, they join the, trade union (SACCAWU) to fight racism in the
workplace. Identity, or the experience of another identity, an
other identity, an identity they appear to reject, becomes
significant in the formation of the union. They see themselves as
black workers, some as African workers. But there was no
difference from the interviews. Being a worker is not a
fundamental experience, it emerged. In fact, I had a sense that
there was no clearly formulated concept of worker. The
experienced that seemed to count the most was of racial identity.
"We are treated differently we are black". It appears that to be
black becomes sharp when they enter the workspace. For some of
them, gender is not an issue at the workplace. Race becomes an
important element in the formation and constitution of SACCAWU.
For example, a week strike was launched at Pick 'n Pay,
Blackheath over a manageress who had been known to be racist.
This was during the second half of 1994.
The narrative construction of race in the workspace is in terms
of the categories of black and African. But this happen as a
result of a particular and relative appropriation of these
categories. It also happens in the context of the absence of a
clearly formulated discourse of racism on the part of management.
African women workers at Pick 'n Pay see themselves as black, but
they do not think that this is an identity category that should
be used in the workplace. Thus, whenever, they are engaged in
different forms of its rejection, this is usually in response to
a particular construction of racial identity in the workplace.
This is a construction that denies them access, benefits, and
career opportunities. But their challenge of that construction is
not to assert it; it is somewhat a denial of race. There is a
process of the Africanisation of trade unions in South Africa.
These workers discover (Laclau, The Making of Political
Identities. 1994, p. 2) the existence of an identity that
operates to exclude them. They then respond to it; but they do
not respond to themselves as black; they respond to the black
identity that functions to exclude them. In joining the union
movement, they see the latter as mechanism to advance their
interests as 'black workers" [The meaning of black shifts here.
This is the blackness that is constructed; they have to operate
with the constructed notion of blackness, in order to respond to
racism. There is a direct appropriation, even when it is
problematic]. These workers do not lack identity; they are not
characterised by identification (Laclau, The Making of Political
11
Identities, 1994, p. 3). Identification is the precondition for
the formation of identity (Laclau, The Making of Political
Identities, 1994, p. 3).
CASE THREE: THE PAINS OF IDENTITY.
Interview was conducted in Zulu.15 The Interviewee is from
Mofolo, Soweto. She has been working at Pick 'n Pay since 1985.
She is a single mother, and is raising two sons. She works in the
Frontline Department as a tillpacker.
IN HER OWN WORDS:
"Blacks are not trusted because management says that we
teach each other how to steaJ^U—" Colour-ed-s—a-r-e—promoted
and we are not". "We teach them jobs, and they instead
get promotion". "You see that coloured woman over
there?. I taught her everything. She came here from
University not knowing anything about the machine, but
then I'm told that I have no education". "But I have
service".
"We are not treated like this because we are women".
"It is because we are black". "Management treats
everyone black person alike". "There is too much racism
here". "Shopstewards are weak. They do nothing for
'abantu' (black)". "There is also favouritism. This is
between management and the black supervisors".
"Favouritism is rife among black people". "Coloureds
and whites like racism, but blacks like favouritism".
111 came to Pick 'n Pay desperate and in need of money.
But I was lured by the promise that one, once employed,
grows within the company. This has never happen to me.
I have been a tillpacker, since 1985". "Before I was in
High School".
"SACCAWU is hopeless;, it has failed".
"It is not a problem of all Pick 'n Pay stores; it is
this management". "For example, Southgate has given
permanent status to all its casuals".
ANALYSIS AND ARTICULATION I:
"I would like to write the history of this prison, with
all the political investments of the body that it
gathers together in its closed architecture. Why?
Simply because I am interested in the past? No, if one
means by that writing a history of the past in terms of
1 5
 Interview, Ormonde Pick 'n Pay, November 14 1994.
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the present. Yes, if one means writing the history of
the present" .16
"We think too much in terms of history, whether
personal or universal".17
"We (must) begin by questioning that progressive
metaphor of modern social cohesion - the many as one -
shared by organic theories of the holism of culture and
community, and by theories who treat gender, class or
race as social totalities that are expressive of
unitary collective experiences".18
There is no sense of history in this project. There is no
teleology to the reality of the social phenomenon of identity.
The investigation on the question of identity is not conducted
narratively, in terms of pattern, structure, organization, or
even with the implicit desire to teleologize, to reach an end, to
attempt to conclude on identity. There is no beginning and ending
to the process of identity. Simply put, my attempt is to capture
the social contexts of the manifestations of identity. My attempt
is make sense of the conditions of the possibility of identity.
That is, the concern is to attempt to show how the reality of
identity, in terms of the "history of the present", emerges and
develops. But this is a history without beginnings, without
origins, without pasts. It is a history without any genealogical
traces. The present is past, in as much as the past is present.
There is no line which separates us from the past, or another
that begins the future. This is identity. There is no single
line, but multiple lines without any origins. Writing about the
past, writing the past is writing about the present, Each history
is its own present. There is no past history. History is always a
double present. First, it is the present that pretends to be
writing the past, that claims to be located in the past; that
claims, on the basis of 'historical' evidence, to represents the
past, to deal with the past. Second, it is the present of a
repetition, of seeking the transformation of the present context,
the context of its own writing. It is in the second sense of this
double present that we begin to see the possibility of writing
about identity, identity as representation. Indeed, it is as
representation that this paper will approach the question of
identity, in order to examine the question of its possibility. I
do not assume the a priori status, or condition of identity, as a
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 31.
Gilles Deleuze, Dialogues, p. 2.
1ft
Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994),
p. 142.
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Whether it is a busy day, or a slow day, their presence
confronts all. It is through the contact that we make
with them that we realize the space we stand on. We
pass them on our way to the various sections of the
stores, and we also pass through them on the exit of
the store. They are unavoidable. One can even perhaps
state that they are the store. They handle the cash,
and deal constantly with a variety of customers. They
work under constant surveillance.
ANALYSIS AND ARTICULATION II:
What at first appears to be the identities of African women
workers is revealed through further research to be "outside
identities", or marginal identities. Identities show themselves
to be fragments of other identities, to be other identities, to
be displaced identities. What is revealed is the indeterminate
practices of identities. This indeterminacy leads to the
possibility of the impossibility of the essentialization of
identities. Identities remain beyond reach, out of grasp, beyond
simple comprehension. Relations which these women with others,
the multiple others (friends, colleagues, family, lovers,
husbands, supervisors, bosses, union leaders, and with many
unnameable others) are not necessarily the constitutive elements
of their identities, nor are they the outcome of other relations,
past and primary relations. What is impossible to outline with
any sense of certitude, in this social space of perpetual
relationality, is the pure and natural state of any identity.
[Identity is forever displaced, ever postponed. This is the
strategic moment of Derrida's differance, the moment when
ontology is rendered impossible through the activity of
undecidability]. Within their lives, in their various forms of
multiplicities, dispersed in all facets of social life, identity
reveals itself to be an indeterminate element (Laclau & Mouffe,
Hegemony & Socialist Strategy, 1985).
ANALYSIS AND ARTICULATION III:
Thus the movement of identity, from a particular social space
(Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive
Sociology, 1990) to the other, from one space that has proved
itself incapable of making a difference on the various elements
that circulate within its limiting boundaries, to another that
has the potential to provide it with new expression, is never
articulated through neutral processes. [Marx writes that capital
is a social relation, and regarding his bias on class identity,
he writes: "But here individuals are dealt with only in so far as
they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments
of particular class relations and class interests" (Preface to
Capital, Volume 1. 1867). The limits of this conceptualization in
terms of the denial of the fluidity inherent in social life, or
capitalist social formation is clear in the interpretation of the
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somehow permanency of "economic categories" and the "embodiments
of class relations and interests". What seems to severely
undermines Marx social theorization is the invalidity of the
primacy that he gives to class identity, especially in its rigid
forms. Is there any other form?]. We have long been reminded by
McLuhan that the medium is the message. He writes: "In a culture
like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing all things
as a means of control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock to be
reminded that, in operational and practical fact, the medium is
the message" (Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (London:
RKP, 1964, p. 15. My emphasis) The past innocence of
representation is no longer a possible idea. It is equally true,
however, that things-in-themselves, the Kantian noumena. remain
problematic to determine, even to articulate. What these thoughts
seek to raise is one dimension of the complexities surrounding
the question of identity - the dimension of its representation].
The mediation of this shift is itself a process of construction -
the construction of identity, but the construction (by the
medium, the mediator) of another identity, an other identity, an
unknown identity. But identity does not by itself enter into the
spatiality of movement ["movement is distinct from the space
covered. Space covered is past, movement is present, the act of
covering (the act of creating)" (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The
Movement-Image. p. 1). Identity is not put into motion by an
internal logic, a logic that distinguishes it from other elements
that are usually naively defined as non-identity. In fact, within
this movement, this "act of covering", identity does not enter as
an object. Partly, because there are no boundaries that limit the
character of the movement, its distance, its duration (Henri
Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 2). On a closer examination,
however, identity becomes itself this movement, this shifting
process, this passage that enables, or struggles to define it as
such. In this sense, identity is incapable of entering into any
partnership with movement, or even of participating in the logic
of transference and transcendence. It is not transported, nor is
it the message of the medium. In this regard, the singularity
that deserves our attention is the complex relation of
identity/movement, of identity as/in movement. What also becomes
problematic in this relation of movement/identity - it is a
movement of relation, as a result of the impossibility to
stabilize the core features of identity - is the attitude of the
desires (in the positive sense of Anti-Oedipus) to define
identity, to re-present identity, to give to us the social object
of identity. We begin to agree with those who wrote before us
that the act of representation of anything is impossible, not
because Derrida, following Artaud, was the first to highlight
this notion, but precisely because the logic that underlies the
idea of representation is one that defeats, at the very moment of
its origins, the articulation of representation. Identity is not
representation. It is not representable, like life itself
(Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, 1978, p. 234).
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ANALYSIS AND ARTICULATION IV:
The complexity of African identity in the modern social formation
is complicated by its location within the ever-variable social
space of urbanity. [Marx writes: "All fixed, fast-frozen
relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices
and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed one become
antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into
air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled
to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his
relations with his kind" (Manifesto of the Communist Party)].
What is identity within this spatiality? Where does identity
begins? What are the limits of identity within the complexity of
urban space? What forms of relations does a single identity,
assuming that this proposition is valid, have with other
identities? What is the history of these relations? What
mechanisms sustain these relations? Are socio-political,
historical, institutional, and cultural factors sufficient to
explain the various forms of these relations? We can never begin
to start the series of questions around the issue of
prioritization of the levels that are said to constitute identity
- politics, language, discourse, experience, social relations,
communities, social associations, social movements, ethnicity,
and many others. Our problem is not one of determination, of
trying to grasp, with a blind "frenzied effort" (Hegel,
Phenomenology of Spirit. Preface, 8), the material reality of
social identity within spatial arrangements. Spaces do not
articulate the complexity of identity-formation. Spaces,
themselves, are not a priori given, passive, and systematically
productive in the production and constitution of identity. Spaces
do not produce anything, least of all the social object of
identity. Spatiality is not formed once-and-for all, and its
subsequent social expression is that of production. What the
concept of spatiality begins to function for our question of
identity is the outline of the fragments of the possibility of
identity-formation. In a limited relative sense, spatiality is
the "condition of the possibility" of identity, itself a
problematic notion. Kant is therefore incorrect to define space
as a mode of representation through which objects are "determined
or determinable" (Critique of Pure Reason, B. 37), even when
space itself is not an "empirical concept" (Critique of Pure
Reason, B. 38). Space is the inner intution that conducts the
possibility of "outer experience" (Critique of Pure Reason. B.
38). Thus, for Kant, space is a "necessary a priori
representation which underlies all outer intuition" (Critique of
Pure Reason, B.38). What Kant fails to analyse is the question of
space as a formation, and not as a "pure intuition" (Critique of
Pure Reason, B.39). There is, therefore, no relation between
space and identity, in whatever form. What exists is the
representational function of space. Identity comes from this
function. However, space is not what gives rise to identity.
Space does not exists a priori to identity. There is no relation
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between space and identity. [The ontology of space is itself
rendered impossible by the questions that demands and seek to
outline its determinacy. What we must note is that our problem is
purely methodological. The truism that facts do not speak for
themselves often begs the question of the constitution and
subsequent muteness of these very facts. We therefore need to
engage with the critical question of the formation of facts, of
the objects of our knowledge, of identity, and multiple
identities themselves.]. On the question of the urban space and
its multiple dispersion, Castells writes: "Cities are living
systems, made, transformed and experienced by people. Urban forms
and functions are produced and managed by the interaction between
space and society, that is by the historical relationship between
human consciousness, matter, energy and information" (The City
-and the Grassroots: A—G^o&s—Cultural Theory—e^ —tJ-r-ba-n—Soel-a-l-
Movements. 1983: p.xv). In this passage, which opens a detailed
empirical analysis of "urban social movements", the objectivity
of separate social categories, categories that come to interact
with one another through the mutual recognition of differences
and conflict, is an asserted without a consideration of the
formation of these very categories. This is a form of Kantianism
in the disguised of empirical research/data. Thus, we see the
metaphor of production taking a role of inscribing what
constitutes the the formation of the urban space - urban social
spaces are produced through multi-level interactions. But what
allows for this production? what initiate the forces of
production to enter into this specific practice? What this
analysis begs is the question of motion/movement.
ANALYSIS AND ARTICULATION V:
The exercise of outlining and describing the social manifestation
of identities is not correlative with the much more difficult
exercise of the engagement with the theoretic-methodologies
underlying, almost to the point of control, the formation and
constitution of identities as social objects. The theoretical
tasks that must always confront those of us who are not contend
with the descriptive exercise are those that require us to detail
the formation of social objects, which are at the core of our
knowledge, in this instance the formation of identity. How is
this social object formed? How does it come to us? How did it
become formed in its own particular manner? What has made it
different from other social objects? Is its formation complete,
or is it an unending process? We all know that knowledge is of
social objects. Social objects form what for us is knowledge, and
we do well to listen to Bourdieu's caution: "In the social
sciences, the progress of knowledge presupposes progress in our
knowledge of the conditions of knowledge" (The Logic of Practice,
p. 1). The key phrase here is "our knowledge of the conditions of
knowledge". This is a fundamental presupposition. We seek to
examine the "conditions of the objects of knowledge". However,
the advances made in the domain of knowledge are often devoid of
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a correlative progress in the knowledge of the "condition of
knowledge". They are never the same thing. But it is critically-
important that we give attention to the question of the
"conditions of the possibility of knowledge", for the simple
reason that our interest is not merely to compile a list of new
entries in the Grand Knowledge Catalogue, but also, to make
visible by means of critical analysis, the means through which
our knowledge is possible.
Thus, we find Foucault, in his outstanding methodological
treatise in the social sciences, where he notes the complexity
that goes into the formation of objects, writing: "(The object
of) mental illness was constituted by all that was said in all
the statements that named it, divided it up, described it,
explained it, traced its developments, indicated its various
correlations, judged it" (The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 32) .
He continues: "this group of statements is far from referring to
a single object, formed once for all, and to preserving it
indefinitely as its horizon of inexhaustible ideality". There is
a multiplicity of objects, and not a singular object. In his well
known example of madness, there is no single madness. We thus
cannot begin our analysis from the object, as there is no object,
but objects. What these objects of madness, for example, have in
common are statements: "one should confine one's attention to
those group of statements that have one same object" (The
Archaeology of Knowledge, p.32). The focus of the analysis is not
on the "permanence and uniqueness of an object", but on the
"space in which various objects emerge and are continuously
transformed" (The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.32). This space is
one of statements and discourse. Objects emerge in relations;
they emerge through relations. Within a relation, objects are
named, described, analyzed, appreciated, and judged" (The
Archaeology of Knowledge, p.32). This is possible through the
"rule of successive emergence". Thus, the unity of a discourse on
identity, for example, is not "based on upon the existence of the
object (identity), or the constitution of a single horizon of
objectivity" (The Archaeology of Knowledge, p.32). The discourse
of identity is a result of the "interplay of the rules that makes
possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time"
(p.32-33). The object of a discourse are multiple and varied. It
is not a single discourse. Some objects are "shaped by measures
of discrimination and repression"; others are "differentiated in
daily practice" in the many social institutions within which they
circulate; others are manifest in the signs and codes of social
life and relations. Thus a discourse is formed by the "rules that
define the transformations of these different objects, their non-
identity through time, the break produced in them, the internal
discontinuity that suspends their permanence" (The Archaeology of
Knowledge, p.33). From this, it is clear that objects that
constitutes our social knowledge are not simply given. They do
not exist in-themselves, outside of relations. They do not exist
in mute forms, and passively wait our violent gestures of
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appropriation and representation. What is significant are not the
objects themselves, but the processes that leads to their
formation and constitution. This is equally true of the social
object of identity.
The relation among identities is characterised by different
levels of incommensurabilities - "For it is impossible to know
what the state of knowledge is ... without knowing something of
the society within which it is situated" (Lyotard, The Postmodern
Condition, p.13) [The multiple, different identities, bespeaks
different forms of knowledge, some positivist, others "critical,
reflexive, or hemerneutic" (The Postmodern Condition, p.14).
Positivist knowledge of identities is directly linked to the
notion of its materiality, while the hermeneutic knowledge is
-jCQiicer-ne-d^ AE:Lt.h—its value,—its—meaning-,—its—symbolic—status-,—and
cultural location. Identity itself is a form of these knowledges,
and these are invariably an articulation of power relations. We
begin to see identity located with the power/knowledge relation.
Identity's level of manifestation reflect a particular form of
power/knowledge. Thus, "each of us knows that our self does not
amount to much ... but no self is an island; each exists in a
fabric of relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever
before. Young or old, man and woman, rich and poor, a person is
always located at the 'nodal points' of specific communication
circuits, however tiny these may be. Or better: one is always
located at a post through which various kinds of messages pass"
(The Postmodern Condition, p.15). At one level of their
constitution, social relations (identity) are composed of
language games - we move within and through language games.
Languages games are the "minimum relation required for society to
exist: even before he is born, if only by virtue of the name he
is given, the human child is already positioned as the referent
in the story recounted by those around him, in relation to which
he will inevitably chart his course" (The Postmodern Condition,
p.15). Further, even the "question of social bond is itself a
language game, the game of inquiry" (The Postmodern Condition,
p. 15) . This adds to the complexity of the formation of
identities. It is the field of language games that shows
identities to be not as simple as we tend to imagine them. In the
empirical form of language games, identities are incommensurable
- "an incommensurability between popular narrative pragmatics"
(The Postmodern Condition, p.23). "It is therefore impossible to
judge the existence or validity of narrative knowledge on the
basis of scientific knowledge ... All we can do is gaze in
wonderment at the diversity of discursive species" (The
Postmodern Condition, p.26). The concern is not to determine the
question of meaning, of the meanings of these identities. We can
never begin to mourn the "loss of meaning". The realization for
us is to accept that "knowledge is no longer principally
narrative" (The Postmodern Condition, p.26). [What has
subsequently occurred is the relocation of identities from the
level of social materiality to the complex level of language
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games, as identities come to exist through the narrative form.
Through narrativity, the question of the determination of the
formation of identities is rendered difficult and problematic.
The narratives of identity are not the same as the discourse of
identity. The latter is underlined by serious tones of formalism,
and the former are simply straightforward. However, the
narratives of identities - as reference of what people themselves
say, where they say, how they say it, to who they say it to - do
not act as the raw material for the formation of the discourse of
identity. The latter is a form of abstraction. It is as a result
of critical reflection. It is structured by power relations (The
Archaeology of Knowledge. 1972). This discourse of identity is
not a mere appearance, or reflection of objectivity. The
discourse itself has no relation to the complex formation that
leads to the emergence of identity. Thus the categories of any
social theory are themselves incomplete. We do not as yet
possess, in our minds and books, complete forms of social
theories. What this means is that identity as an important
category of social theory is also incomplete, remains forever
absent. However, the form of this specific incompleteness is not
comprehensible within a dialectic interpretation of social life.
Identity remains undialectic, or incapable of any form of
participation in the dialectic logic, through its status as an
non-object.
Laclau writes, in New Reflections, "social relations are always
contingent ... they are always power relations ... the
constitution of a social identity is an act of power and that
identity as such is power ... power is the prerequisite of any
identity ... power is the condition for society to be possible"
(p.31-33). These reflections are problematic in their conception
of power and power relation outside of the critical structure of
their relationship with knowledge. There is no power, in as much
as there is no knowledge. No objectivity of each. These
categories do not exist independent of each other. Their
formation is not a singular event that through its specific
conditions of emergence give rise to them. The originary moment
of power is in-itself the birth of knowledge. Laclau continues:
"To study the conditions of existence of a given social identity
... is to study the power mechanisms making it possible" (New
Reflections, p.32). We see here the simplicity of the notion of
the given asserted in an unproblematic manner. How is it possible
for social forces, social objects, and social relations to be
given? Why do others appear earlier in historical formations, and
others later? What determines the givenness of a social object?
The contingency logic of social life renders it impossible for
the a priori givenness of a social object. A social object can
never, at any moment in the structure of social life, exists as a
givenness, in the form of this relative condition. The notion of
the given in Laclau's assertion precludes any anticipation of the
knowledge forms that enable this social object to have an
ontological status. That is, power does not come to work on a
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social object, such as identity. Power is not independent of
identity, as knowledge. Power in itself does not create the
social object of identity. Power is not the objective threat to
the social form of identity. The objectivity, as a series of
perceptual relations, of social identity is not an a priori
condition for its existence. There is no possibility of an
external appropriation of a social object. That is, power
relations do not give rise to social identity. This is too
unilinear and causal. Not even the axis of power
relations/knowledge give rise to the social existence and
objectivity of social identity.] This is the lesson we learn from
Foucault: "we should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to
imagine that knowledge can exist only where power relations are
suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its
injunctions,—its demands and its interests-—=-r-.—We—s-houid—admit-
rather that power produces knowledge ... that power and knowledge
directly imply one another; that there is no power relation
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor
any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the
same time power relations" (Discipline and Punish, p.27). We
have, theoretically, transcended the binarity of power vs
knowledge. Our reflections are now problematically located within
the relationship of power/knowledge. It is within this structure
of social life that the category of identity emerges and exists.
Identity, all identities, are located within the matrix of power
relations/knowledge. Our analysis of them are informed and likely
to give us better insight into the character of identities once
we begin to operate through this matrix of power
relations/knowledge. Here we cease to speak about the notion of
objectivity, even "asserting the contingent nature of all
objectivity" (New Reflections, p.31). We cease to have interest
in the question of the character of social life - determinism vs
contingency; absolute constitution vs relative structure.
Identity does not have a relation to a social context, in that
identity is not a social object in a social context. The notion
of social context does not exists, in any conceivable form, as a
base of the formation and formulation of identity. It is not, in-
itself function with an explanatory value. It is not even primary
to the other social objects and relations. Social context is
itself a social object, in need, desperately of explanation.
Thus, to give the notion of social context a certain explanatory
value in the study of social life is to ignore the question of
its condition of possibilities. This kind of analysis runs into a
circular explanation, and never becomes able to break the circle.
The question, therefore, is whether social context can stand
outside itself, be examined from asocial position? Is it possible
to discuss social processes such as identity outside of the much
valued notion of social context? Such questions haunt us still.
The primacy of identity in social life and relation is not as a
result of an inherent logic located within identity itself.
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Identity does not contain anything within its fragile boundaries.
This condition comes from the interplay of social forces that, in
ways that are disconnected to identity itself, find themselves in
mutual reinforcement of a particular pattern of meaning. The
resultant is this temporal meaning which we characterise as
identity. But this is not a product, something that has been
processed and finally delivered. Things remain forever contested
through the logic of indeterminacy. What is specific does not
happen because of the necessary condition created by social
relations and contexts. Issues of specificities are enabled due
to the inability of things to be positioned, in whatever manner.
This disabling logic in much of social life gives us the
formation of social relations, and therefore we do not
necessarily absolutize the specificities in themselves, as though
they resolve, for us, the problems of knowledge in social life.
Specificities lead to, through their relative social force, to
focus analytically on the problems of knowledge, and to realize
the extent to which we are still far remove from the desire of
separating ourselves from all epistemologies. But this does not
mean that now we can finally grasp, make tangible through the
primitivity of the technological hand, the objects of our
knowledge (in fact, the truth is, knowledge is not located in the
immediacy of social objects - social objects are the same as
Durkheim's social facts. The truth is we never know what counts
as knowledge). Therefore, the relative determination of
specificities is not a necessary moment of the resolution of the
eternal problem of knowledge. Through this, we begin to see the
complex web within which the question of identity is located. Its
determination through knowledge categories reveals it to be a
complex category in social life.
Outside of itself, identity continues to retain its identity. The
exteriorized identity of identity, the perceptible perception of
another identity, the representation of identity, another
identity. Within its own limited, although constantly shifting,
boundaries, identity is unsettled; it is uncomfortable. This
unsettlement comes from a relative logic strategically situated
within the margins of identity. The marginalities within the
unsettle limits of identities are never identifiable. What we
have is an image of unclassifiable social formation. The imagery
is what never leaves us. We entertain and anticipates the images
of identity, of identity as an image. We pursue social life
through the images of identity. It is these images, which we
never know in what form they might appear before us, and thus
become further disabled to grasp them, that we have defined to be
at the core of the constitution of social life. These images of
identity circulate in an never-ending process of obsession. We
think we know what identity, but we are never able to specify its
limits and boundaries, or even its potentials. Thus, we find
ourselves in imagery relations with similar and other individuals
and social groups who share our specific obsession concerning the
imagery of identity. These relations, in their forms of fluidity,
23
end up in a state of dispersion. We never know where they are
located. Further, it is no longer possible for empiricism,
empiricity, the empirical to act as the absolute, or even
relative, determination of truth, knowledge, social process and
positionality, and identity. The priority given to empiricity,
unduly so in certain unclear historical processes, is not a
mandate of the eternal recurrence, or repetition of this social
value. The critical contest between different forms of
epistemologies is far from over, even when certain fluid
institutional boundaries pretend to have overcome the struggle.
These epistemological struggles are not completed through the
assertion of one epistemological value over the other, nor are
they fully determined through the violence that continuously
accompanies the social act of conformity and representation.
-Empirical research,—regardless—of the—amount o-f—details-t-ha-t—go
into its constitution does not solve the numerous epistemological
problems that persists outside of epistemological positions. In
this sense, empirical data must be treated with the same
relativity that other epistemological positions often receive.
What remains outside of these epistemological positions is not,
as is often wrongly interpreted, their common notion of
relativity. It is rather, the character of the question of
epistemology itself. This is the question that defies the
confining limits of the epistemological positions. As we move to
accept this logical outcome, we realize, regarding the question
of identity-formation, with its underlying tones of
epistemological problematics, that a certain form of reflexivity
takes place in the space that has been preserved for identity,
the spatiality of the "conditions of the possibility". This
reflexivity is one that turns itself against the logics of
identity and its possible potentials. The reflexivity begins to
move away from the dualism of interiority and exteriority. In
this moment of reflexivity, when identity is demobilized, is
rendered difficult to articulate, identity becomes a social
impossibility. Identity is ruined within itself. Its
epistemology, its, rather, multiple epistemologies, are no longer
possible. The ontology of identity also becomes obsolete.
Conceptions of identity are linked with certain epistemological
positions. In this sense, identity is an epistemological category
- its character, its ontology, its relations with other
categories. Identity tells us about its knowledge operations,
where it is possible for it to operate, how it can best operate.
Identity, is therefore, not a neutral social process. It is
heavily infused with the intimate relation of power
relation/knowledge. The study of identity, or of any social
process, is not possible, if we still entertain notion of
totality and holism, ontology, through a certain unmediated
prioritization of a particular epistemological position. What is
at issue in the social study of social processes is not the ways
and means of the determination of the social verification of
certain social realities, such as identity. What remains
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singularly critical is the primary question of the conceptual and
theoretical analysis and determination of those social realities
themselves. We need to search for a certain theoretical
possibility of these social realities. That is, the social
category of identity must be posed in terms of the question of
knowledge.
"Everything is form, and life itself is form" - Balzac.
The logic of identity is, therefore, defied by its relationality
to the space of its possibilities. The relation is neither
causal, nor dialectic . The relation is not, further, bounded to
the elements that defines it. That is, the relation is not
limited to what constitutes it. The question of space and
identity is one of relationality, and it is this inherent process
that defies, or undermines the possibility of identity. Once
constructed by relation, identity ceases to be what we imagine it
to be. The imagery is inconceivable. In this manner the question
of the formation of identity is continuously deferred. We have no
possible means and ways to begin on the question of identity
[Said notes that "The problem of beginnings is one of those
problems that, if allowed, ... confront one with ... intensity on
a practical and ... theoretical level" (Beginnings: Intention &
Method, p. 3). Thus, "what is a beginning? What must one do in
order to begin? What is special about beginning as an activity or
a moment or a place? (Beginnings, p. xi).] Identity has not been
destined to begin, or even to have a place of origin. We remain
constantly defeated in our attempts to originate -the birth of
identity. Identity does not originate in space, from space. It
also does not begin from the relationality of space to
'identity'.
Identity as a single social category is rendered impossible by
the complex web within which it emerges and have forms of
existences. This complexity is heightened by the specific
conditions of the urban space/context. This space effectively
undermines, as a consequence of its structure and forms of social
forces that it allows, the single construction and manifestation
of identity. It denies the ontologization of that which we desire
as identity. The complexity of the urban space, defined as a set
of multiple social relations that inherently irreducible to any
specific logic, allows for the continuous displacements of all
ontologies. Identity, as another desire, a peculiar modern
desire, of ontology, of presence, of existence, of being, of
teleology, becomes impossible within the parameters of this
complexity. Thus, the character of this space is one of non-
ontologies, or a systematic deconstruction of all ontologies.
Within this space claims to identity are nothing more that
violent desires, the ultimate desire for social destruction.
Identity within this complex web exist in the form of a
structured relation. It is an overdetermined social process
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(Althusser, For Marx. 1969; Derrida, "The Time of a Thesis",
1983). It is not itself; it is itself. It exists in the discourse
of the social relations; it exists in the spatiality and social
distribution of social bodies; it exists in the social
arrangements of social institutions. Its textured is the
structure of the social fabric of social life. It is multiple in
this sense. It is, further, multi-layered. It is not located in
the structure of what individuals, or social groups say. These
are simple attempt to create a binarized social life.
THE EMPIRICITY OF SOCIAL IDENTITIES:
"(O)ur thought, in its purely logical form, is
incapable of presenting the true nature of life, ... In
fact, we do indeed feel that not one of the categories
of our thought - unity, multiplicity, mechanical
causality, intelligent finality ... - applies exactly
to the things of life: who can say where individuality
begins and ends, whether living being is one or many,
... In vain we force the living into this or that one
of our moulds. All the moulds cracks. They are too
narrow, above all too rigid, for what we try to put
into them" .21
My aim has been not to intefere with the objectivity of social
identities through a prioritization of the practice of
representation. I have tried to resist reprensenting the other,
the African women workers. Instead, I have sought to present
social identities as they are, to allow for the naive practice of
self-representation. What I tried to avoid, although it remains
incomplete given the nature of the dominant paradigm which allows
for this practice to take place, has been the practice of
representation. Not only do facts never speak for themselves,
but,, whenever they do, they speak through the form of
representation. Representation becomes a dominant mediator in the
social visualization of social life. It creates for the
multifacet imageries of social life.
However, the critical questions that remain with us are the
following: what is the character of the empirical data on
identity? what data was collected, should have been collected on
identity? is this data qualitative or/and quantitative? The
nature of the empirical data of this project reflects the
inconclusiveness surrounding the question of identity. The data
is not the final statement on the question of identity-formation.
Rather, the data is an approximation towards the answer of the
question of identity formation. In itself, and within its limits,
the data is not exclusively concerned with identity. The data did
2 1
 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, Translated by Arthur Mitchell
(London: Macmillan, 1928), p. x.
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not exist, prior to its discovery, for the confirmation of the
question of identity formation. The data that I have been able to
gather can be said to be a distorted picture of the social
manifestation of identity. What is important is not the data, as
a form of value that tends to assume relative ontology, but the
reflections and meditations on a form of social life and social
relations that operate with a valorization of identity. Thus the
essence of this project is a critique of identity, and not, as it
might misleadingly appear in this paper, a proof of the social
reality of identity, another statement on identity. The aim is to
displace our concern with the question of identity, by showing
the social impossibility of identity within an impossible
category of the social (Laclau, The Making of Political
Identities. 1994) .
Identity, if it ever exists in the most dominant and violent form
of social context, is somewhere located in-between (Bhabha, The
Location of Culture, 1994) language, discourse, the body, social
institutions, social relations, politics, culture, religion,
ethnicity, race, sexuality. It is not a "single sign of
difference" (The Location of Culture, p. 219). Identity does not
even begin to occupy a specific social space of its own and which
it fills with a sense of dominance. That is, identity is not
embodied in any of the various societal arrangements. Identity is
dispersed within these and other social forms. It is fragmented
within social forms of social life. But it is itself a social
form. Focillon writes that all social objects are "part of a
system of highly complex relationships" (The Life of Forms in
Art. Translated by Charles Beecher Hogan & George Kubler, New
York: Zone Books, 1992, p.31). Life is a creators of forms (Life
of Forms, p.33). Form is the modality of life (Life of Forms,
p. 33) . For Focillon, forms are at the core of both natural and
social lives. Form is a construction of space and matter (Life of
Forms, p.33). Identity is similar to a work of art, in that it is
constructed in as much as a work of art is. Thus a "work of art
exists only insofar as it is form" (Life of Forms, p.33). "We are
always tempted to read into form a meaning other than its own, to
confuse the notion of form with that of image and sign. But
whereas an image implies the representation of an object, and a
sign signifies an object, form signifies only itself" (Life of
Forms, p.34). This problematizes identity. Identity assumes an
aesthetic form, and its value in social relations is contested
through access to cultural capital (Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction:
A Social Critique of Taste, 1984. The aesthetics of identity
remind us of the contestation surrounding its representation
(Spivak's Can the Subaltern Speak?; Who speak for whom? Who has
the social and political, and even cultural legitimacy to speak
for others, on their behalf?) Its aesthetics reflect the diverse
ways in which its specific cultural appropriation takes places
and is institutionalized. Thus, when its cultural forms are
consolidated in socio-political practices of museum, social
events, seminars, and so on, we then realize the impossibility of
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the gesture to attain, to retrieve the true meaning of identity.
We can only be nostalgic about the absence of identity. But we
can never ignore the significance of Marx's words:
"All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is
profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with
sober senses, his real conditions of life".
28
